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2009, this paper examines the distinct impact of financial integration and globalization on 
several dimensions of real activity. We find that: (a) financial integration has progressed 
significantly worldwide, particularly in emerging markets, as well as within regions; (b) 
advances in financial integration predict better growth prospects; (c) both advances in 
financial integration and globalization are associated with higher growth, lower growth 
volatility, and lower probabilities of severe declines in real activity. Advances in financial 
integration and globalization indeed foster countries’ growth, and there appears to be no 
trade-off between these advances and macroeconomic stability. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The vast empirical literature surveyed by Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei (2009) offers 
contrasting results regarding the real effects of financial globalization. Broner and Ventura 
(2010) point out that the absence of a consensus regarding the real effects of financial 
liberalization policies is in part due to the difficulty in separating the effects of such policies 
from other policies. Many studies use de-jure, rather than de-facto liberalization measures. 
In this paper we examine the distinct impact of de-facto measures of financial 
integration and globalization on several dimensions of real activity. Financial integration is 
defined as the movement towards equality of discount factors used to price traded assets, as 
dictated by standard finance theory;  globalization is an increase in financial openness. The 
distinction between financial integration and globalization is important: globalization may be 
necessary for financial integration to occur, but it may not be sufficient to guarantee that a 
country’s financial system is integrated with world markets in ways that foster an efficient 
capital allocation.
1  
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we document advances in 
financial integration worldwide using a large dataset that includes data for fifty two countries 
during the period 1985-2008 by applying techniques borrowed from growth theory. From 
this analysis,  we construct a simple proxy measure of financial integration. Second, we test 
the predictive power of our measure of financial integration on measures of growth prospects 
that factor in uncertainty in expectations about growth. This complements and extends the 
analysis of Bekeart et al. (2007), who do not account for uncertainty in growth prospects. 
Finally, we assess the impact of measures of financial integration and globalization on 
growth, growth volatility, and the probability of a severe decline in real activity. To our 
knowledge, no study has examined the distinct impact of financial integration and 
globalization measures on these dimensions of real activity simultaneously. 
                                                 
1 For example, Stultz (2005) pointed out how poor corporate governance can be an impediment to financial 
integration. More generally, in recent models by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006), Heathcote and Perri (2004, 
2009) and Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009), different degrees of financial integration across countries 
do not necessarily yield unequivocal predictions on the size and direction of capital flows, hence, on financial 
openness. For a simple model illustrating the effect of financial integration  on efficient capital allocation and 
and related empirical tests, see Abiad, Oomes and Ueda (2008)  3 
 
Building on Adjaouté and Danthine (2004), we begin our analysis by testing cross-
country convergence of the mean and volatility of equity excess returns globally, by region 
and within regions, with a methodology akin to the one used in the growth literature. We find 
strong evidence of advances in financial integration with such advances being primarily 
driven by advances of financial integration in emerging markets countries.  
We then assess the predictive power of financial integration and globalization for 
growth prospects. To this end, we use a proxy measure of financial integration and one of 
growth prospects. Financial integration is proxied by a distance measure of a country’s 
excess returns from the group average at each date, which is meant to capture a ranking of 
countries’ financial integration within a group. Growth prospects are proxied by a country’s 
market price-to-earnings (PE) ratio relative to the world PE ratio standardized by its 
volatility. Then, we use monthly frequency data to assess whether financial integration 
predicts growth prospects (as well as the converse) globally, by region and within regions. 
We find that advances in financial integration significantly predict better growth prospects, 
but better growth prospects do not necessarily predict advances in financial integration.  
The analysis just described focuses on financial integration only, and concerns growth 
prospects rather than actual growth. Therefore, we consider the impact of financial 
integration and globalization on growth, growth volatility and a proxy measure of severe 
declines in real activity. Financial globalization is measured by the growth rate of financial 
openness, defined as the ratio of the sum of external assets and liabilities constructed by Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and updated up to 2008, standardized by GDP. We also construct 
two measures of capital flow volatility to capture uncertainty and the potential for instability 
in the globalization dimension.   
We find that higher levels of financial integration and globalization are both 
associated with higher growth and lower growth volatility, whereas the volatility of capital 
flows does not have any significant impact on both variables. We also find that higher levels 
of financial integration and globalization robustly and significantly predict lower 
probabilities of severe declines in real activity, and this predictive power is stronger for 
emerging markets. These latter results are especially important, since the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis and the attendant historically sharp drop in real activity has raised the question of 
whether financial integration and unfettered globalization can be sources of macroeconomic  4 
 
instability (see, e.g. Stiglitz, 2010).. Our evidence is at odds with the view that financial 
integration and globalization in and of themselves are sources of macroeconomic instability. 
Finally, we document the cross-sectional relationship between financial integration, 
globalization and proxy measures of the quality of the institutional environment and 
corporate governance.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, we find that better institutions and corporate 
governance are associated with higher levels of financial integration and globalization. 
Notably, however, the quantitative impact of improvements in both institutions and corporate 
governance is significantly larger for financial integration than globalization.  
All in all, our results indicate that financial integration and globalization appear to 
yield benefits in the form of enhanced countries’ growth prospects, growth, lower growth 
volatility, while we find no evidence of costs in terms of macroeconomic instability.  
The remainder of the paper consists of five sections. Section II assesses convergence 
in equity market excess returns and defines our measure of financial integration. Section III 
introduces risk-adjusted growth prospects, documents its predictive power for growth, and 
assesses the predictive power of financial integration for risk-adjusted growth prospects. 
Section IV presents the analysis of the relationship between financial integration, 
globalization and capital flow volatility for growth, growth volatility, and systemic real risk, 
and examines the impact of indicators of quality of institutions and corporate governance on 
financial integration and globalization.. Section V concludes. The Appendix details countries, 
data sources and measurements of all variables used.  
  
II.   FINANCIAL INTEGRATION DYNAMICS   
If financial markets become more integrated, the price of risk should converge, As 
stressed by Stulz (1999), such convergence can be associated with a convergence in the cost 
of capital. By equalizing the price of risk and allowing agents to achieve better 
diversification, financial integration should also result in a more efficient allocation of capital 
(see, e.g. see Abiad, Oomes and Ueda (2008) .  
Following Bekaert and Harvey (1995), the simple metric of financial integration we 
use in our empirical analysis is motivated as follows. Consider a region composed of N 
countries, and denote with  1
i
tt E R   the expected conditional market excess return in country  5 
 
i N  . Suppose that the CAPM holds and there is no exchange rate risk. Under full 
integration, for each i N   ,  1
i
tt E R   satisfies: 
11 1 cov( , )
ii N
tt t t t E RR R       (1) 
where  1
N
t R   is the return on a value-weighted region portfolio, and  t   is the expected price of 
(covariance) risk in the region. By contrast, in a fully segmented market  
11 var( )
ii i
tt t t E RR        (2) 
where 
i
t   is the expected local price of risk.  As shown in Bekaert and Harvey (1995), in a 
partially integrated region, expected excess returns can be proxied by: 
             11 1 1 cov( , ) (1 ) var( )
ii i W i i i
tt tt t t t t t E RR R R                (3) 
 where  [0,1]
i
t   is an estimate of the likelihood that a market is integrated. Although 
Equation (3) cannot be viewed as a restriction on expected returns implied by an explicit 
asset pricing model, it can be useful to obtain a proxy measure of financial integration. If  
i
t 
’s move towards unity  then, as discussed in Adjaouté and Danthine (2004),  convergence in 
expected excess returns can be interpreted as the result of increased integration.  
Thus, we gauge advances in financial integration by testing whether there is a 
significant decline in the cross-country dispersion of equity market ex-post excess returns.
 2  
Ex-post excess returns may be an imperfect measure of expected excess returns for several 
well-known reasons. For our purposes, temporary deviations from convergence may occur 
because of differences in countries’ savings rates or investment opportunities. Moreover, 
equity market excess returns in each country could converge because financial assets in each 
country may be increasingly affected by common factors (the term  11 cov( , )
iW
tt R R   in 
Equation (3) may be time varying and become increasingly similar across countries), 
independently of convergence in the price of risk. This is why in our statistical model for 
excess return we control explicitly for these common factors.  
Convergence in excess returns is assessed with a metric germane to that used to gauge 
growth convergence in the growth literature (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003). To 
                                                 
2 As shown by Solnik and Roulet (2000), if excess returns follow a single factor model, then the evolution of 
their cross-country dispersion is inversely related to their pairwise correlation. A similar approach in the context 
of a multifactor model is followed by Eiling and Gerard (2007).  6 
 
implement this metric, we formulate the following statistical model for the dynamics of the 
cross-country dispersion of market excess returns.  
Let 
i
t R   denote the market excess return in country iat date t, We assume that 
i
t R  




ti t i t i t i t i t R FRh                       (4) 
22 2
11 it it it it hab c h      .                          (5) 
 
The term  t F  in Equation (4) is a risk factor common to all countries, and the 
innovations it  are assumed to be i.i.d. and normally distributed with zero mean and unit 
variance.  Equation (5) describes the evolution of country-specific volatility.  The conditional 
mean of 
i
t R  is given by 11 ()
ii
tt i ti t t mR F R      , while the conditional variance is given 
by
22 2
1 var ( ) ( )
i
tt i F i t R th    .  To obtain a model for the cross-country variance of excess 
returns and their country-specific volatility, we assume that the coefficients { , , , } it i i i a    are 
distributed cross-sectionally with means { , , , } t a    and variances 
22 2 2 {,,,} ta     ,  and 
that co-variances among all these random variables, as well as that of  1
i
t R   and  t F , and each 
of these is approximately nil.  Under these assumptions, the cross-sectional variance of   
1()
i
tt mR   and 
2
it h  are given by  
 
22 2 2 2 2 2
11 () ( ( ) ( ) ) ( 1 )
ii
Rt t t t t t R tE m RE m R F t                  (6) 
22 2
22 2 2 2 2 22 2 () ( ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) it it at hh tE hE h b t c t
          .               (7) 
 
We take the first principal component of countries’ excess returns as a proxy measure 
of their common risk factor. As noted, taking into account common shocks is important, as a 
decline in 
2 () X t   exclusively driven by a decline in the magnitude of common shocks 
2
t F  
would not necessarily indicate increased integration, since disconnected economies hit by the 
same shock could exhibit the same decline. Increased convergence in the mean of excess  7 
 
returns occurs if 
2
t    exhibits a declining path. Similarly, increased convergence in the 
country-specific volatility of equity excess returns  occurs if 
2
at   exhibits a declining path.  
We estimate the following GARCH(1,1) counterpart of Equations (6)-(7) : 
 
                          
22 2
01 2 3 () ( 1 ) Rt R t t tA A t A FA t H                  (8) 
                        
22 2
01 2 13 1 tt t H BB t B B H                                        (9), 
where 
2() R t   is the cross-country variance of equity market excess returns at each date.   
Convergence in the cross-country dispersion of the mean of excess returns occurs if  1 A  is 
negative. Similarly, convergence in the cross-country dispersion of the country-specific 
volatility of excess returns occurs if  1 B  is negative.   
We use monthly equity market data from DataStream and Standard & Poor’s for the 
period February 1985-April 2009. The risk-free rate is the yield on government securities at 
maturities ranging from one month to three months, depending on data availability.  Our 
sample consists of 52 countries, including 24 developed countries and 28 emerging market 
countries in Europe, Asia and America.  Data sources and the list of countries can be found 
in the Appendix.  
By estimating Equations (8)-(9) including all countries, we test world convergence in 
excess returns.  Estimates of Equation (8)-(9) are also presented for two different types of 
country subsamples. The first type of subsample excludes from the entire sample countries 
that belong to a particular region. In this case, a comparison of the estimated coefficient 
obtained when all countries are included, with that obtained by excluding a subsample, 
gauges the relative contribution of that subsample to worldwide convergence of excess 
returns. This amounts to comparing estimates of the trend coefficients ( 1 A  and 1 B )—when 
2() R t   and 
2
t H  are computed by including all countries in the sample—with estimates of the 
trend coefficient when 
2() R t   and 
2
t H  are computed excluding all countries in a given 
subsample. The second type of subsample includes only countries in a particular region. 
Thus, estimates of the trend coefficients provide a gauge of convergence of excess returns 
within a region-- that is, a measure of regional financial integration.   8 
 
Table 1 reports the results of the estimation of Equations (8)-(9). As shown in the 
estimates including all countries (Regression (1)), both trend coefficients  1 A  and  1 B  are 
negative and significant, indicating strong world convergence in the mean as well as in the 
country-specific volatility of equity market excess returns. As shown in Regression (2), 
world convergence is significantly driven by convergence in emerging markets countries, as 
the trend coefficients in both the mean and variance equations are lower (in absolute value) 
than the coefficients obtained when all countries are included. By the same token, as shown 
in Regressions (3)-(5), all regions have contributed to increased financial integration as 
convergence in the mean of excess returns, although convergence in country-specific 
volatility appears significant especially in Latin America.  
Turning to regional integration, we find that convergence in the mean of excess 
returns occurred in each of the regions (Regressions (6)-(8))). With regard to European 
financial integration, the estimate of the trend coefficient obtained in Regression (8) is 
significantly larger, in absolute value, than that estimated when emerging European countries 
are excluded (Regression (9)).  Thus, countries in emerging Europe have experienced a faster 
convergence than the group of other countries, thereby significantly contributing to 
convergence in the mean of excess returns within that region. In sum, financial integration 
has progressed significantly worldwide, and progress has been primarily driven by advances 
in emerging markets countries, particularly in Europe
3   
These results support the construction of a proxy measure of the “relative” degree of 
financial integration of a given set of countries. This measure is given by the distance of the 
market excess returns of a country from a measure of central tendency of the cross-country 
distribution of market excess returns in a particular sample. Specifically, for country j in year 
t and a sample of N countries, this measure, called ISPEED, is given by  
 
                                                 
3  Our results are consistent with those obtained by Bekeart et al. (2009), using measures of market 
segmentation., and with those obtained by Garcia-Herrero and Wooldridge (2007), who find evidence of a 
decreasing correlation between domestic investment and savings for samples that do not include the period of 
the global financial crisis: such decrease in correlation is a broad implication of increased financial integration.  








jt t t i ISPEED R R
N
   ,   (10) 
In essence, ISPEED records the position of the market excess return of a country relative to 
the average excess return of a group of countries. The higher is the level of financial 
integration in a region, the smaller should be the cross-sectional average of the (quadratic) 
distance of countries’ excess returns from the region’s central tendency.  
 
 
III.   FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND GROWTH PROSPECTS 
As noted, advances in financial integration should have a positive impact on a 
country’s growth prospects, since integration would foster a more efficient allocation of 
capital across firms and sectors in each country. To test this broad implication of theory, we  
construct proxy measures of countries’ growth prospects at a monthly frequency with the 
important property that they have significant predictive power for GDP growth. We test for 
this property using data at an annual frequency, but then proceed to examine the predictive 
power of financial integration for growth prospects using data at a monthly frequency, which 
is a frequency seldom used in this kind of tests.  
 
A.   Measures of Growth Prospects Predict Growth 
A forward-looking measure of growth prospects is given by a market price/earnings 
ratio PE (see, e.g. Bekaert et al, 2007). Our measure of growth prospects is given by the ratio 
of the local market PE ratio to the world PE ratio, divided by its volatility. Thus, our 
measures of growth prospects can be viewed as embedding an adjustment for risk.  
We consider the local market PE relative to the world PE ratio to control for different 
industry compositions within a country relative to the world aggregate, which may impact 
country growth differentially. The volatility adjustment is important since PE ratios may 
exhibit significant fluctuations that can arise from both market uncertainties regarding future 
growth of the economy, as well as from the temporary appearance of “bubble” components  10 
 
in prices of some domestic equity markets. Thus, volatility-adjusted PE ratios may be better 
predictors of growth than unadjusted ratios. As we show below, this is indeed the case.
4  
Thus, our measure of risk-adjusted growth prospects of country j in month t, is a 








 ,                 (7) 
where   / jtj t w t SPE PE PE   denotes the ratio of country j’s market PE ratio to the world PE 
ratio  wt PE . This measure is computed in each month using a rolling window of data of the 
preceding twelve months.
5   
To test the predictive power of RAGP for GDP growth using data at an annual 
frequency, we estimate the following dynamic panel regressions using the Blundell and Bond 
(1998) system GMM estimator with country and time fixed effects:  
 
            12 1 1 jtj t j t j tj t GDPG RAGP GDPG         ,               (8)         
                             
where  jt GDPG is real GDP growth in country j in year t, α1j and α2j are country-specific fixed 
effects.  As shown in Table 2, an increase in risk-adjusted growth opportunities strongly and 
significantly predicts future growth. Notably, this predictive relationship is strong and 
significant for both developed and emerging markets economies. As noted, this result 
supports the use of our measure of growth opportunities in our higher frequency samples to 
examine the predictive power of financial integration for future real activity.    
 
B.   Financial Integration Predicts Risk-Adjusted Growth Prospects 
Does financial integration have a positive impact on growth prospects? The finding of 
a positive impact would suggest that financial integration indeed has positive expected real 
effects. Conversely, the finding that improvements in growth prospects have a positive 
                                                 
4 More generally, a measure of risk-adjusted growth prospects may be viewed as more closely associated with 
welfare, as welfare is likely to be lower in an economy with very high, but very uncertain, growth prospects, 
compared with an economy in which growth relative to growth volatility is lower.   
5 The results we present below are essentially unchanged  when we use a 24 months’ window.   11 
 
impact on financial integration would suggest that these improvements may spur subsequent 
financial integration.   
We assume that the dynamics of RAGP and ISPEED follows autoregressive processes 
conditioned on their own past values in a VAR-type fashion. Specifically, the coefficient 
associated with past values of ISPEED in the RAGP equation yields an estimate of the 
predictive power of integration on a country’s growth prospects. Conversely, the coefficient 
associated with past values of RAGP in the equation of ISPEED as dependent variable yields 
an estimate of the impact of RAGP on future financial integration. Thus, the impact of 
financial integration (growth prospects) on future growth prospects (financial integration) is 
assessed by positing the following panel models for RAGP and ISPEED: 
 
  11 1 1 11 1 1 jt j jt jt t jt RAGP ISPEED RAGP Y             (9), 
  22 1 2 12 1 2 jt j jt jt t jt ISPEED RAGP ISPEED Y             (10). 
In both equations,  1j   and  2 j   are country-specific effects and 1 it Y  , i=1,2,  is a vector 
of time-specific controls to be defined momentarily. Our main focus is on estimates of the 
coefficients  1   and  2  , and on testing whether their values are negative and significantly 
different from zero. These tests essentially aim at establishing whether a country that 
experiences increased integration, in the form of a reduction in the distance of its excess 
returns from the group average, also witnesses a subsequent increase in its growth prospects.  
The finding of a negative relationship between the country-specific measure of integration 
and growth prospects would thus suggest that such growth prospects indeed improve with 
integration. 
One important statistical issue is the possible presence of unit roots in the (panel) 
data-generating process for RAGP and ISPEED, since these measures generally exhibit high 
persistence. This could make it difficult to carry out valid inference on the coefficients of 
interest if the unit root hypothesis is not rejected.  We address this problem by adopting a 
specification of Equations (9) and (10) along the lines suggested by Pesaran (2007). Doing  12 
 
that makes it feasible to test both whether the unit root hypothesis can be rejected and 
whether the coefficients  1   and  2  are negative and significant.   
As in Pesaran (2007), we subtract the lagged value of the dependent variable from 
Equations (9) and (10), set the vector of time-specific controls equal to the cross-sectional 
average of the lagged level and first difference of the dependent variable, denote with  first 
differences, and estimate the following two equations: 
 
11 11 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 (1 ) jt j jt jt t t jt RAGP ISPEED RAGP ARAGP A RAGP                   (11), 
22 1 2 1 1 2 1 (1 ) jt j jt jt jt ISPEED RAGP ISPEED AISPEED           
22 1 2 jtj t A ISPEED        (12). 




tj t j ARAGP N RAGP

      is the cross-sectional average of 




tj t j A RAGP N RAGP

       is its first difference. 




tj t j AISPEED N ISPEED

      is the cross-sectional 




tj t j A ISPEED N ISPEED

       is its first 
difference.  The (panel) unit root hypothesis is rejected if  1 i   <0, i=1,2.  
Table 3 shows the results of these specifications for the entire sample, for Europe, 
Asia, and Latin America.  First note that in all estimates, the unit root hypothesis is rejected 
with high confidence, since the robust t-statistics associated with  1 i   <0, i=1,2 are well 
below the cross-sectionally augmented Dickey-Fuller critical values reported in Pesaran 
(2007) at 1 percent confidence levels.  
In the entire sample (Regressions (1) and (5)), both  coefficients  1   and  2   are 
negative and significant at conventional significance levels. This finding suggests the 
existence of a virtuous dynamics, whereby financial integration improves future growth 
prospects and, in turn, improved growth prospects advance financial integration.  
When we look at the same relationships in the context of regional integration, as 
opposed to world integration, we obtain results consistent with the convergence results in   13 
 
excess returns described previously. The European sample exhibits the same pattern of the 
world sample: The coefficient  1   is negative in Regression (2), and both coefficients  1   and 
2   are negative and significant in Regression (6)), indicating that the virtuous dynamics 
between financial integration and growth prospects also holds at the regional level. By 
contrast, such dynamics appears weaker for the Asian and Latin American samples 
(Regressions (3)-(4) and (7)-(8)), suggesting a higher degree of heterogeneity of the financial 
integration process in the countries included in these subsamples.  
In sum, a proxy measure of financial integration predicts a measure of a country’s 
growth prospects. Regional financial integration appears to have played a particularly 
significant growth-enhancing role in Europe. Conversely, better future growth prospects 
may, but need not to, foster future advances in integration.  
 
IV.   FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND GROWTH DIMENSIONS 
Obstfeld (2009, p.63) observed that “there is strikingly little convincing 
documentation of direct positive impacts of financial opening on the economic welfare levels 
or growth rates of developing countries.”  Work by Quinn and Toyoda (2008) indicates that 
some of the inconclusive results of the literature may be due to problems of measurement of 
financial openness following liberalization. Moreover, some recent studies (e.g. Bonfiglioli, 
2008, and Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel, 2009) find a positive impact of financial 
openness on productivity growth, which is a key driver of growth.
6  On the other hand, few 
studies have examined the relationship between increased openness and growth volatility. 
Buch, Dopke and Pierdzioch (2005) do not find a significant impact of financial openness on 
growth volatility. Some studies that use sectoral or firm level data find positive effects of 
increased openness on both growth and volatility. (see e.g. Levchenko et al., 2009, and 
Kalemni-Ozcan, Sorensen and Volosovych, 2010).   
                                                 
6 Few studies examne the relationship between openness and growth volatility. Buch, Dopke and Pierdzioch 
(2005) do not find a significant impact of financial openness on growth volatility. Some recent literature has 
focused on growth volatility at a sectoral or firm level, using a variety of measures of financial openness: a 
recent review of this literature is in Kalemni-Ozcan, Sorensen and Volosovych (2010).  This is openness...to 
refine  14 
 
Differing from existing studies, here we focus on the distinct impact of financial 
integration and de-facto globalization on three dimensions of growth: growth levels, growth 
volatility and the probability of severe declines in real activity. Our measures of globalization 
are based on the data on external assets and liabilities constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2007). As dictated by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti dataset, we use data at annual frequency. Our 
measure of globalization, called FGLOB, is the growth rate of financial openness, defined as 
the growth rate of the ratio of the sum of external assets and liabilities to GDP. In addition, 
we examine capital flow volatility as an important dimension of financial globalization. We 
construct two proxy measures of capital flows volatility: volatility of capital outflows, called 
COFV , computed for each country as the absolute value of the difference between the 
growth rate of the ratio of external assets to GDP and its sample average; and volatility of 
capital inflows, called  CIFV , which is computed for each country as the absolute value of 
the difference between the growth rate of the ratio of external liabilities assets to GDP and its 
sample average. As before, financial integration is proxied by the ISPEED measure we have 
introduced previously, where the monthly ISPEED measure is averaged for each year.  
 
A.   Growth and Growth Volatility  
We estimate dynamic panel models of the following form, using Blundell and Bond 
(1998) GMM estimators with country and time fixed effects:  
 
  12 1 1 1 jtj t j t j t j t j tj t Y ISPEED FGLOB CFV Y              ,      (13) 
 
The dependent variable  jt Y  is either GDP growth, or a proxy measure of volatility of 
GDP growth, termed GDPGV, which is computed for each country as the absolute value of 
the difference between GDP growth and its historical mean. Note that country fixed effects 
control for unobserved country characteristics that do not change through time, or change 
very slowly.
7   
                                                 
7 Among these characteristics, variables capturing the quality of institutions have been used extensively as 
explanatory variables in many empirical specifications of growth-type regressions (see, for example, Bekaert, 
Harvey and Lundblad, 2005 and Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel, 2007).  15 
 
Table 4 reports the results with GDP growth as the dependent variable for the pooled 
sample, the advanced economies sample, and the emerging market sample.  In the pooled 
sample (Regressions (1)-(3)), ISPEED is negatively and significantly associated with growth. 
Thus, an increase in financial integration, captured by a reduction in ISPEED, is associated 
with a higher GDP growth rate. Likewise, the coefficient associated with the lagged value of 
FGLOB is positive and significant, implying that higher financial globalization is associated 
with higher subsequent GDP growth. Furthermore, the coefficient associated with the 
volatility of capital outflows is not significant, indicating that this dimension of openness 
does not have an impact on growth. By contrast, the coefficient associated with the volatility 
of capital inflows (Regression (4)) is positive and significant, albeit weakly. .  
The results of the regressions for the sample of advanced economies (Regressions (4)-
(6)) and that of emerging markets (Regressions ((7)-(8)) overall indicate differential strengths 
of the positive effects of financial integration and globalization on growth. For advanced 
economies, the coefficient associated with ISPEED is still positive but not significant, while 
it is positive and highly significant for the emerging market economies, signaling a stronger 
positive impact of financial integration for these countries. By contrast, the positive impact of 
globalization appears comparatively stronger in advanced economies. Lastly, while the 
volatility of capital outflows does not appear to have a significant impact for both country 
groups, the coefficient associated with the volatility of capital inflows is positive and highly 
significant for emerging market economies, while it remains not significant for advanced 
economies.  
In sum, both financial integration and globalization are associated with higher growth 
levels in all economies in our sample. Moreover, financial integration appears to have a 
comparatively stronger positive impact on growth in emerging market economies, while 
globalization has a comparatively stronger impact on growth in advanced economies.  
Table 5 reports the same regressions presented in Table 4 with our proxy measure of 
GDP growth volatility as the dependent variable.  In  the pooled sample (Regressions (1)-
(3)),  ISPEED is positively and significantly associated with growth volatility. Thus, an 
increase in financial integration, captured by a reduction in ISPEED, is associated with   
lower growth volatility. Likewise, the coefficient associated with the lagged value of FGLOB 
is negative and significant, implying that higher financial globalization is associated, again,   16 
 
with lower growth volatility. Interestingly, both measures of volatility of capital flows have 
no significant impact on growth volatility.  
Similarly to the growth regression results, the regressions for the sample of advanced 
economies (Regressions (4)-(6)) and that of emerging markets (Regressions ((7)-(8)) indicate 
that the strength of the negative impact of advances in financial integration and globalization 
on growth volatility varies across these country groups. For advanced economies, the 
coefficient associated with ISPEED is positive but not significant, while it is positive and 
highly significant for emerging market economies, indicating a stronger volatility-reducing 
effect of financial integration for these countries. On the other hand, for both advanced and 
emerging market economies the coefficient associated with FGLOB is negative but not 
significant in most regressions. This result is likely due to the lack of sufficient cross-country 
variation of FGLOB within the two samples. Lastly, for all samples, the volatility of capital 
flows does not have a significant impact on growth volatility 
In sum, both advances in financial integration and globalization are associated with 
lower growth volatility. In addition, the volatility of capital flows does not seem to have any 
significant impact on growth volatility.
8  
 
B.   Systemic Real Risk 
Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei (2009)  observe that “there is little formal empirical 
evidence to support the oft-cited claim that financial globalization in and of itself is 
responsible for the spate of financial crises that the world has seen over the last three 
decades” (op. cit., 2009, p.28). Several studies focusing on the impact of financial openness 
on financial crises find little support for a positive relationship between openness and 
financial instability. More recently, Bekaert, Harvey and Lumblad (2009) examine the impact 
of measures of financial openness on a binary indicator of “banking crisis”, and find no 
significant relationship between financial openness and the probability of a “banking crisis”. 
Boyd, De Nicolò and Loukoianova (2010) find some evidence of a positive relationship 
                                                 
8 Our findings can be also viewed as consistent with those obtained by Beckaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2006), 
who find that consumption growth volatility is lower as a result of de-jure measures of financial liberalization,  
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between financial openness and indicators of systemic bank shocks for country level data, but 
no relationship between financial openness and the probability of systemic bank failures in 
Logit regressions based on firm-level data.  
Differing from most studies that focus on systemic financial risk, here we assess 
whether there exists a significant relationship between financial integration, globalization, 
and indicators of systemic real risk, defined as in De Nicolò and Lucchetta (2011). Indicators 
of systemic real risk capture tail realizations of declines in real activity. The main advantage 
of using these indicators is eschewing the challenging task of defining and dating episodes of 
bank or financial fragility. Whenever financial instability carries significant adverse real 
effects, these effects will be reflected in declines in real activity and will be captured by our 
indicators.  
We construct two measures of systemic real risk. The first one, called SR5, is a binary 
variables that take the value of one if in a given year a country’s ratio of GDP growth to its 
standard deviation, which is computed for the entire length of the sample, is in the lowest 5
th 
percentile of its cross country distribution, and zero otherwise. The second measure, called 
SR0, can be viewed as a lower bound to systemic real risk realizations:  it is a binary variable 
that takes the value of one if GDP growth in a given year is negative, and zero otherwise. To 
maximize the size of the empirical distribution of GDP growth, SR5 and SR0  are computed 
on the basis of  GDP growth data since the year 1960. 
Similarly to the specification of equation (13), we estimate the following Logit 
model: 
11 1 (1 ) ( ) jt jt jt jt jt P SR Logit ISPEED FGLOB CFV GDPG           
    (14) 
 
Table 6 reports the results for the pooled sample, as well as the samples of advanced 
and emerging market economies.. In the pooled sample (Regressions (1)-(3) of panel A), the 
probability of a systemic risk realization SR5 is lower the higher is financial integration, as 
the coefficient associated with ISPEED is positive and significant. The coefficients 
associated with FGLOB and capital flow volatility are all negative but not significant. By 
contrast, in the regressions with SR0 as the dependent variable, the coefficients of ISPEED 
remain positive but not significant, that associated with FGLOB is positive and highly 
significant, and the coefficients associated with capital flow volatility are positive and  18 
 
(weakly) significant. These results suggests that higher levels of financial integration may be 
associated with lower macroeconomic instability, while higher levels of globalization and 
capital flow volatility may be associated with lower probabilities of milder systemic real risk 
realizations, such as recessions.  
The results for the sample of advanced economies (Table 6, Panel B) and those of 
emerging markets (Table 6, Panel C) indicate differential strengths of the positive effects of 
financial integration and globalization on systemic real risk across these two country groups. 
For advanced economies, the coefficient associated with ISPEED is positive but not 
significant, while it is positive and significant for the emerging market economies, indicating 
a stronger impact of financial integration in reducing systemic real risk for these countries. 
By contrast, the coefficient of FGLOB is negative in all regressions in both country groups, 
but is significant only for SR0, suggesting that financial globalization is associated with 
lower probabilities of recessions. Lastly, the coefficients associated with capital outflow 
volatility are not significant, while that associated with capital inflow volatility is negative 
and significant in the regressions with SR0 as the dependent variable in the emerging market 
sample.  
Summing up, we generally find a significant negative relationship between financial 
integration, globalization and the probability of a systemic real risk realization, and a 
negative relationship between capital inflow volatility and the probability of a recession. 
These results, together with the evidence on growth volatility reported previously, are at odds 
with the conjecture that there is a trade-off between financial integration, globalization , 
growth and macroeconomic stability.  
 
C.   The Role of the Quality of Institutions and Corporate Governance 
If financial integration and globalization are important drivers of growth prospects 
and in and of themselves, and do not pose risks of macroeconomic instability, a natural 
question is: what are their main determinants?  Here we present evidence on the relationship 
between our integration and globalization measures and two sets of potential determinants 
that many contributions in the literature have singled out as impacting on the levels of 
financial integration and globalization: the quality of institutions, and that of corporate 
governance.   19 
 
As measures of the quality of institutions, we take the governance indicators 
constructed by Kaufmann, Krey and Mastruzzi (2009). These include six survey-based 
measures of institutional quality: Control of Corruption (the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain); Voice and Accountability (citizens’ ability to participate in 
selecting their government); Political Stability (the stability of elected government bodies); 
Government Effectiveness (the quality of public services and that of policy formulation and 
implementation); Regulatory Quality (the ability of the government to implement regulations 
that permit and promote private sector development); and Rule of Law (the quality of contract 
enforcement and protection of property rights).  
As measures of the quality of corporate governance, we take the two indicators of 
corporate governance quality based on accounting data of firms listed in equity markets 
constructed by De Nicolò, Laeven and Ueda (2008), and updated to the year 2008. These 
indicators capture the quality of accounting disclosure and transparency, and are standardized 
so that an increase of an indicator signals better corporate governance. The first indicator, 
Accounting Standards, captures the degree of accounting disclosure of firms in a country. 
The second indicator, Earning Smoothing, is a measure of “earnings opacity” that tracks the 
extent to which managers may conceal the true performance of firms using accruals to 
smooth fluctuations of annual profits.   
The relationship between financial integration, globalization, and the quality of 
institutions and corporate governance was estimated by means of the following random effect 
model: 
 
  1 jt t jt jt jt YX      ,            (15) 
     
where  jt Y  is either ISPEED or FGLOB,  jt X are the indicators of quality of institutions and 
corporate governance,  1t   are time fixed effects, and  jt   are random effects. 
Table 7 reports the results of the estimates of the coefficients associated with each 
institutional and corporate governance variable. Next to each estimate, we also report the 
quantitative impact of each variable on the dependent variable whenever the relevant 
coefficient is significant at least at a 10 percent confidence level. This is measured as the  20 
 
change in  jt Y  implied by a standard deviation increase in  jt X  as a fraction of the sample 
mean of  jt Y .  
Each indicator of the quality of institutions has a positive and quantitatively 
significant impact on both financial integration and globalization. Remarkably, the 
quantitative impact of the quality of institutions on our measure of financial integration is 
larger than that on globalization for each of the quality categories. These results are 
consistent with the view that the poorly developed institutions contribute to keep capital 
markets segmented (see Bekaert, 1995) and discourage foreign direct investment.  With 
regard to corporate governance, better corporate governance is generally associated with a 
higher level of integration and globalization, although the coefficients in the relevant 
regressions are not significant, and the quantitative impact of these variables is generally 
smaller than the more encompassing measure of quality of institutions 
In sum, the quality of institutions and corporate governance are important 
determinants of both financial integration and globalization. Remarkably,  the positive 
impact of good institutions and corporate governance appears comparatively stronger for 
financial integration. 
 
D.   Robustness 
As pointed out in the literature, the possible endogeneity of the financial integration 
and globalization variables and the potential impact of omitted variables are the typical 
problems that may induce biases in the estimated coefficients of the type of regressions we 
have presented.   
We assess the robustness of our results to these problems in Table 8. Columns (1)-(2) 
report GMM dynamic panel estimations of our baseline growth and growth volatility 
regressions for the pooled sample, with the matrix of instruments designed to treat the 
variables ISPEED and FGLOB  as  endogenous. It can be easily seen that the results are 
basically the same as those of the correspondent regressions reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
Similar results (not reported) are obtained when all other previous specifications are run with 
the integration and globalization variable treated as endogenous.   21 
 
Columns (3)-(4) we report GMM dynamic panel estimations of our baseline growth 
and growth volatility regressions for the pooled sample using the “double differencing” 
estimation implemented by De Nicolò, Laeven and Ueda (2008), which can control for the 
omission of all variables whose dynamics can be approximated by a stochastic trend.
9. Again, 
the results are basically the same as those reported in columns (1)-(2).  
Lastly, in columns (5)-(6) we report Logit regressions where we replace the financial 
integration variable with the fitted values of the regressions reported in Table 7 , with the 
variables indexing the quality of institutions as explanatory variables.  This amounts to 
“instrument” ISPEED with the variables tracking the quality of institutions. However, we 
continue to treat lagged values of FGLOB as exogenous. It can be seen that the results are 
basically the same as those of the correspondent regressions reported in Panel A of Tables 6. 
In sum, our results appear robust to the potential endogeneity of the financial 
integration and globalization variables, as well as to a large set of omitted variables.  
 
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has examined the distinct impact of financial integration and globalization 
on four dimensions of real activity: growth prospects, growth, growth volatility and a 
measure of macroeconomic instability. Financial integration predicts better growth prospects, 
but the converse does not necessarily holds; and both financial integration and globalization 
are associated with higher growth, lower growth volatility and lower probabilities of sharp 
declines in real activity.  
                                                 
9  Consider the regression (a):  1 () it i it it it it YX l n Z Y          and suppose that the vector of 
variables ln( ) it Z  includes all variables that affect  it Y . Defining  1 tt t x xx    , (a) can be expressed as: (b) 
1 () it it it it it YX l n Z Y            . Suppose vector  it Z  satisfies  () it i it ln Z G   , where  it   
are identically, independently distributed. and uncorrelated over time and across units (countries), define 
ii AG    and  it it it      , and assume  all  it   are  uncorrelated with  it X  and  it   . Then, one can 
write (c)  1 it i it it it YA X Y        . Estimation of   is obtained by applying the difference GMM 
estimation procedure developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to equation (c), which is implemented through to 
“double” differencing equation (a)... 
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Overall, these results suggest that financial integration and globalization are likely to 
yield the beneficial real effects resulting from a more efficient resource allocation predicted 
by theory. We do not find direct evidence of costs in the dimension of macroeconomic 
instability. Policies aimed at fostering financial integration of capital markets and financial 
sectors, as well as continuing removing impediments to financial globalization, may be 
necessary, albeit not sufficient, to allow countries to reap these benefits.      23 
 
REFERENCES 
Abiad, Abdul, Ninenke Oomes, and Kenichi Ueda, 2008, The Quality Effect: Does Financial 
Liberalization Improve the Allocation of Capital?, Journal of Development 
Economics,  Vol. 87, 270-282.  
 
Adjaouté, Kpate, and Jean-Pierre Danthine, 2004, Equity Returns and Integration: Is Europe 
Changing?,  Oxford Review of Economic Policy 20(4), 555-70. 
 
Barro, Robert,  and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2003, Economic Growth, 2
nd Edition, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
 
Bekaert, Geert, 1995, Market integration and investment barriers in emerging equity markets, 
            World Bank Economic Review 9, 75–107. 
 
Bekaert, Geert, and Campbell Harvey, 1995, Time-Varying World Market Integration, 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 50, No. 2, 403-444.  
 
Bekaert, Geert, Campbell Harvey, and Christian Lundblad, 2005, Does Financial 
Liberalization Spur Growth?, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 77, 3-55.  
 
Bekaert, Geert, Campbell Harvey, and Christian Lundblad, 2006, Growth Volatility and 
Financial Liberalization, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 25, 370-
403.  
 
Bekaert, Geert, Campbell Harvey, and Christian Lundblad, 2009, Financial Openness and 
Productivity, NBER WP No. 14843.  
 
Bekaert, Geert, Campbell Harvey, Christian Lundblad and Stephan Siegel, 2007, Global 
Growth Opportunities and Market Integration, Journal of Finance 62(3), 1081-1137.  
 
Bekaert, Geert, Campbell Harvey, Christian Lundblad and Stephan Siegel, 2009, What 
Segments Equity Markets?, NBER WP No. 14802.  
 
Blundell, Richard and Stephen Bond. 1998.  Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in 
Dynamic Panel-data Models.  Journal of Econometrics, 87: 115-143. 
 
Bonfiglioli, Alessandra, 2008, Financial Integration, Productivity and Capital 
Accumulation”, Journal of International Economics, 76, 337-55.  
 
Boyd, John, Gianni De Nicolò, and Elena Loukoianova, 2010, Banking Crises and Crisis 
Dating: Theory and Evidence, CESifo Working Paper # 3134, July.   24 
 
Broner, Fernmando and Jaume Ventura, 2010, Rethinking the Effects of Financial 
Liberalization, NBER Working paper 16640, December.  
 
Buch, Claudia, Joerge Dopke and Christian Pierdzioch, 2005, Financial Openness and 
Business Cycle Volatility, Journal of International Money and Finance, 24, 744-765. 
 
De Nicolò, Gianni, Luc Laeven and Kenichi Ueda, 2008, Corporate Governance Quality: 
Trends and Real Effects, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 17, 198-228. 
De Nicolò, Gianni and Marcella Lucchetta, 2011a, Systemic Risks and the Macroeconomy, 
NBER Working Paper #16998, forthcoming in Quantifying Systemic Risk, Joseph 




Eiling, Esther, and Bruno Gerard, 2007, Dispersion, Equity Returns Correlations and Market 
Integration, working paper,  
 
Garcia-Herrero, Alicia and Philip Wooldridge, 2007, “Global and Regional Financial 
Integration: Progress in Emerging Markets,” BIS Quarterly Review, September, 57-
70.  
 
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, and Olivier Jeanne, 2006, “The Elusive Gains from International 
Financial Integration,” Review of Economic Studies 73(3), 715–41. 
 
Heathcote, Jonathan, and Fabrizio Perri, 2004, Financial Globalization and Real 
Regionalization, Journal of Economic Theory 119(1), 207–43.  
 
———, 2009, The International Diversification Puzzle Is Not As Bad As You Think, 
working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis).  
 
Kalemi-Ozcam, Sebnem, Bent Sorensen and Vadym Volosovych, 2010, Deep Financial 
Integration and Volatility, NBER Working Paper # 15900, April. 
 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Krey and Massimo Mastruzzi, 2009, Governance Matters VII: 
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2007, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper no. 4654.  
 
Kose, Ayhan, Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, and Shang-Jin Wei, 2009, Financial 
Globalization: A Reappraisal, IMF Staff Papers 56 (1), 8-62. 
  25 
 
Lane, Philip R., and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 2007, The External Wealth of Nations Mark 
II: Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, Journal of 
International Economics 73(2), 223-50. 
 
Levchenko, Andrei, Ranciere, Romain and Mathias Thoenig, 2009, Grwoth and Risk at the 
Industry Level: The Real Effects of Financial Liberalization, Journal of Development 
Economics,  89(2), 210-222. 
 
Mendoza, Enrique, Vincenzo Quadrini, and José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, 2009, Financial 
Integration, Financial Development and Global Imbalances, Journal of Political 
Economy 117(3), 371-416. 
 
Obstfeld, Maurice, 2009, International Finance and Growth in Developing Countries: What 
Have We Learned?, IMF Staff Papers 56(1), 63-111.  
 
Pesaran, Hashem, 2007, A Simple Panel Unit Root Test in the Presence of Cross Section 
Dependence, Journal of Applied Econometrics 22, 265-312.. 
 
Quinn, D. and A. Toyoda, 2008, Does Capital Account Liberalization Lead to Economic 
Growth? An Empirical Investigation, Review of Financial Studies, 21, 1403-1449.  
 
Solnik, B. and J. Roulet. 2000. Dispersion as Cross-Sectional Correlation. Financial Analysts 
Journal. 56(1). pp. 54-61. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2010, Risk and Global Economic Architecture: Why Full Financial 
Integration May Be Undesirable, NBER Working Paper 15718, February. 
 
Stulz, René M., 1999, Globalization of Equity Markets and the Cost of Capital, Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, 12, 3, 8-25. 
 











  26 
 
Table 1.  Convergence of Cross-Country Variances  
and Idiosyncratic Volatility of Equity Market Excess Returns 
 




01 2 13 1
() ( 1 ) Xt X t t
tt t
tA A t A FA t H
HB B t B B H
 
 
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   
2 () X t  is the cross-sectional variance of  equity premiums, and 
2
t H  is the variance of 
2 () X t  net of the 
variance of the common risk factor  t F , estimated as the first principal component of countries’ equity 
premiums.  p-values are reported in brackets; * denotes p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p<0.01. The range of monthly 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All Excluding Excluding Excluding Excluding
Countries Emerging Markets Asia Latin America Europe
Mean Equation
A0 99.743*** 0.903** 224.825*** 5.327*** -37.260***
[0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
A1 -0.370*** -0.002*** -0.247***    -0.205*** -0.092***
[0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
A2 0.020*** 0.001*** 0.031*** 0.027*** 0.017
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
A3 -0.062** 0.805*** -0.103 0.098 0.368***
[0.04] [0.00] [0.27] [0.00] [0.00]
Variance Equation
B0 121.548*** 0.006 155.165 21.924*** 2.214
[0.00] [0.91] [0.11] [0.00] [0.87]
B1 -0.380*** 0.001 -0.423 1.512*** -0.005
[0.00] [0.93] [0.13] [0.00] [0.90]
B2 6.809*** 0.557*** 4.167*** 0.197*** 1.059***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
B3 0.006 0.576*** 0.014 -0.033*** 0.486***
[0.34] [0.00] [0.29] [0.00] [0.00]
B. Regional Integration
(6) (7) (8)  (9)




A0 8.764*** -9.929*** 16.757*** 0.575**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03]
A1 -0.042***  -0.226*** -0.120*** -0.002**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04]
A2 0.049*** 0.007*** 0.042*** 0.001***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
A3   0.107** 0.504*** 0.255*** 0.855***
[0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Variance Equation
B0 11.168*** 60.733*** -6.528 -0.003
[0.00] [0.00] [0.26] [0.83]
B1 -0.022 -0.183*** 0.111 -0.001
[0.25] [0.00] [0.16] [0.83]
B2 1.133*** 6.681 1.867*** 0.441***
[0.00] [0.75] [0.00] [0.00]
B3 0.271*** 0.098*** 0.091 0.707***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.17] [0.00] 27 
 
Table 2.  Risk-Adjusted Growth Opportunities Predict Growth 
 
         The estimated model is:  12 1 1 jtj t j t j tj t GDPG RAGP GDPG          ,                        
                                                          
GDPG is real GDP growth, RAGP is the measure of risk-adjusted growth prospects.  1j   are country fixed 
effects, and   2t   are time fixed-effects Estimates are obtained by the GMM System estimator of Blundell and 
Bond (1998).  M1 and M2 are the p-values of the Arellano-Bond statistics for first and second order correlation 
of residuals; Sargan is the p-value obtained by estimates of the two-step version of the models.  Robust p-values 
























(1) (2) (3) 
GDPG(t) GDPG(t) GDPG(t)
GDPG(t-1) 0.365*** 0.443*** 0.284***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
RAGP(t-1) 1.962*** 2.120** 1.286**
[0.00] [0.02] [0.04]
Constant -0.670 2.190*** 8.447***
[0.39] [0.00] [0.00]
M1(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00
M2(p-value) 0.61 0.11 0.61
Sargan(p-value) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Observations/Countries 916/50 529/24 387/26 28 
 
Table 3. Financial Integration and Risk-Adjusted Growth Opportunities 
 
 
The estimated models are:   
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
22 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
(1 )
(1 )
jt j jt jt t t jt
jt j jt jt jt jt jt
RAGP ISPEED RAGP ARAGP A RAGP
ISPEED RAGP ISPEED AISPEED A ISPEED
    
    
  
  
       
       
 
 
 RAGP is the measure of risk-adjusted growthprospects, and ISPEED is the measure of financial integration. 
The other variables are explained in the text. Estimates are obtained with country fixed effects regressions. 
Standard errors are clustered by country. Robust p-values are reported in brackets; * denotes p <0.10, ** p 










(1) All countries (2) Europe (3) Asia (4) Latin America
DRAGP(t) DRAGP(t) DRAGP(t) DRAGP(t)
ISPEED(t-1) -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.003***
[0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.00]
RAGP(t-1) -0.192*** -0.143* -0.078*** -0.306**
[0.00] [0.08] [0.00] [0.03]
ARAGP(t-1) 0.111** 0.0687 -0.003 0.221*
[0.08] [0.17] [0.80] [0.08]
ADRAGP(t-1) 0.513*** 0.533*** 0.475*** 0.507***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
R-squared (within) 0.232 0.225 0.256 0.264
R-squared (between) 0.004 0.023 0.022 0.049
(5) All countries (6) Europe (7) Asia (8) Latin America
DISPEED(t) DISPEED(t) DISPEED(t) DISPEED(t)
RAGP(t-1) -0.122* -0.206* -0.037 -0.171*
[0.07] [0.06] [0.25] [0.09]
ISPEED(t-1) -0.280*** -0.310*** -0.218*** -0.167***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
AISPEED(t-1) 0.193** 0.194** 0.089** 0.051
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.21
ADISPEED(t-1) -0.265*** -0.238*** -0.470*** -0.035
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.39]
R-squared (within) 0.133 0.144 0.160 0.071
R-squared (between) 0.061 0.077 0.230 0.116
Observations/countries 10317/50 5563/28 3164/14 1566/8 29 
 
Table 4. Growth Regressions 
 
The estimated models are:  
 
12 1 1 1 jtj t j t j t j t j tj t GDPG ISPEED FGLOB CFV GDPG             
 
 
GDPG is GDP growth, ISPEED is the financial integration measure, FGLOB is the financial globalization 
measure, and CFV denotes the proxy measures of volatility of capital outflows (COFV) and capital inflows 
(CIFV) as defined in the text.  1j   are country fixed effects, and   2t   are time fixed-effects. Estimates are 
obtained by the GMM System estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998). M1 and M2 are the p-values of the 
Arellano-Bond statistics for first and second order correlation of residuals; Sargan is the p-value obtained by 
estimates of the two-step version of the models: a p-value of 1 implies that the null hypothesis that the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid cannot be rejected. Robust p-values are reported in brackets; * denotes p 


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GDPG(t) GDPG(t) GDPG(t) GDPG(t) GDPG(t) GDPG(t) GDPG(t) GDPG(t) GDPG(t)
GDPG(t-1) 0.417*** 0.434*** 0.436*** 0.447*** 0.447*** 0.446*** 0.352*** 0.374*** 0.387***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ISPEED(t) -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** 0.009 0.009 0.009 -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.26] [0.26] [0.27] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
FGLOB(t-1) 0.046*** 0.034** 0.034** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.035* 0.024
[0.00] [0.02] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.09] [0.17]
COFV(t-1) 0.035 0.004 0.028
[0.15] [0.853] [0.35]
CIFV(t-1) 0.0540* -0.014 0.086***
[0.07] [0.30] [0.00]
Constant 2.654*** 2.203** 2.016** 0.763 1.949** 2.163** 1.151 0.772 0.206
[0.00] [0.02] [0.04] [0.15] [0.03] [0.03] [0.66] [0.79] [0.94]
M1(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
M2(p-value) 0.56 0.45 0.37 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.71 0.75 0.88
Sargan(p-value) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Observations/Countries 939/48 939/48 939/48 544/24 544/24 544/24 395/24 395/24 395/24 30 
 
 
Table 5. Growth Volatility Regressions 
 
The estimated models are:  
 
12 1 1 1 jtj t j t j t j t j tj t GDPGV ISPEED FGLOB CFV GDPGV               
      
GDPGV is the proxy measure of GDP growth volatility, ISPEED is the financial integration measure, FGLOB 
is the financial globalization measure, and CFV denotes the proxy measures of volatility of capital outflows 
(COFV) and capital inflows (CIFV) as defined in the text.  1j   are country fixed effects, and   2t   are time 
fixed-effects. Estimates are obtained by the GMM System estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998). M1 and M2 
are the p-values of the Arellano-Bond statistics for first and second order correlation of residuals; Sargan is the 
p-value obtained by estimates of the two-step version of the models: a p-value of 1 implies that the null 
hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid cannot be rejected . Robust p-values are reported in 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GDPGV(t) GDPGV(t) GDPGV(t) GDPGV(t) GDPGV(t) GDPGV(t) GDPGV(t) GDPGV(t) GDPGV(t)
GDPGV(t-1) 0.225*** 0.213*** 0.222*** 0.232*** 0.233*** 0.231*** 0.186*** 0.143* 0.162**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.08] [0.04]
ISPEED(t) 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.13] [0.15] [0.14] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
FGLOB(t-1) -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.017 -0.025* -0.021
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.58] [0.67] [0.60] [0.18] [0.073] [0.124]
COFV(t-1) 0.007 -0.006 0.0244
[0.56] [0.60] [0.109]
CIFV(t-1) 0.002 0.003 0.016
[0.84] [0.80] [0.30]
Constant 1.917*** 2.000*** 2.042*** 1.387*** 1.501*** 1.366*** 2.550** 3.951*** 3.953**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.01]
M1(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
M2(p-value) 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.82 0.94 0.94
Sargan(p-value) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00





Table 6.  Systemic Real Risk Regressions 
 
The estimated models are: 
 
11 (1 ) ( ) jt jt jt jt P SR Logit ISPEED FGLOB GDPG        
 
    
SR are the indicators of systemic real risk: SR5 equal to 1 if real GDP growth is lower than the 5
th  percentile of 
the cross-country distribution of GDP growth, and 0 otherwise; SR0 equals to 1 if real GDP growth is negative, 
and 0 otherwise. ISPEED is the financial integration measure, and FG is the financial globalization measure 
FGLOB, given by the annual growth rate of financial openness, and GDPG is GDP growth. Estimates are 
obtained by Logit regressions with standard errors clustered by country. Robust p-values are reported in 

















( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
SR5 SR5 SR5 SR0 SR0 SR0
GDPG(t-1) -0.239** -0.256** -0.261** -0.251*** -0.269*** -0.270***
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ISPEED(t) 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0004*
[0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.11] [0.09] [0.08]
FGLOB(t-1) -0.024 -0.021 -0.021 -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.052***





Constant -3.318*** -3.175*** -3.049*** -1.552*** -1.286*** -1.207***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.14






Table 6.  Systemic Real Risk Regressions (cont.) 
The estimated models are: 
11 (1 ) ( ) jt jt jt jt P SR Logit ISPEED FGLOB GDPG          
SR are the indicators of systemic real risk: SR5 equal to 1 if real GDP growth is lower than the 5
th  percentile of 
the cross-country distribution of GDP growth, and 0 otherwise; SR0 equals to 1 if real GDP growth is negative, 
and 0 otherwise. ISPEED is the financial integration measure, and FG is the financial globalization measure 
FGLOB, given by the annual growth rate of financial openness, and GDPG is GDP growth. Estimates are 
obtained by Logit pooled regressions with standard errors clustered by country. Robust p-values are reported in 






(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
S R 5S R 5S R 5S R 0S R 0S R 0
GDPG(t-1) -0.541*** -0.577*** -0.526** -0.361*** -0.361*** -0.360***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ISPEED(t) 0.011 0.012 0.011 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
[0.30] [0.23] [0.31] [0.25] [0.26] [0.25]
FGLOB(t-1) -0.043 -0.072 -0.040 -0.045** -0.046** -0.044**





Constant -3.780*** -2.810*** -4.006*** -1.121*** -0.995** -1.152***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.24 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.11
Observations/Countries 544/24 544/24 544/24 544/24 544/24 544/24
C. Emerging
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
S R 5S R 5S R 5S R 0S R 0S R 0
GDPG(t-1) -0.167* -0.179* -0.204** -0.202*** -0.229*** -0.247***
[0.09] [0.10] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ISPEED(t) 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0003** 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0004**
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.10] [0.10] [0.03]
FGLOB(t-1) -0.0126 -0.010 0.001 -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.057***





Constant -3.041*** -2.895*** -2.469*** -1.674*** -1.310*** -0.916**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.20
Observations/Countries 395/24 395/24 395/24 395/24 395/24 395/24 33 
 
 
Table 7.  Financial Integration, Globalization, and the Quality of Institutions and 
Corporate Governance   
 
The estimated model is:  1 jt t jt jt jt YX      ,       
     
jt Y  is the financial integration measure ISPEED or the financial globalization measure FGLOB (annual growth 
rate of financial openness).  jt X  
are indicators of quality of institutions and corporate governance. Estimates are 
obtained by random effect regressions with standard errors clustered by country. The quantitative impact is the 
change in  jt Y  implied by a standard deviation increase in  jt X  as a fraction of the sample mean of  jt Y . Robust 










(1) (2) (3) (4)
ISPEED Quantitative FGLOB Quantitative
Impact Impact
Quality of Institutions
Control of Corruption -6.735** -1.20 0.058*** 0.27
[0.04] [0.00]
Voice and Accountability -6.507 -1.15 0.065*** 0.30
[0.15] [0.00]
Political Stability -6.028 -1.24 0.059*** 0.31
[0.11] [0.00]
Government Effectiveness -11.36** -1.64 0.056*** 0.22
[0.04] [0.00]
Regulatory Quality -6.682* -1.00 0.072*** 0.28
[0.08] [0.00]
Rule of Law -5.309** -0.95 0.063*** 0.29
[0.04] [0.00]
Quality of Corporate Governance
Accaunting Standards -1612 -0.41 43.760*** 0.30
[0.41] [0.00]
Earnings Smoothing (Opacity) -317.97 -0.54 7.482*** 0.35
[0.18] [0.00] 34 
 
Table 8.  Robustness  
 
Regressions (1)-(2) are the dynamic panel regressions of Tables 4 and 5 for GDPG and GDPGV with ISPEED 
and the lags of FGLOB treated as endogenous variables in the GMM estimation procedure. Regressions (3)-(4) 
are the same regressions estimated in differences according to the procedure described in De Nicolò, Laeven 
and Ueda (2008) to account for omitted variables exhibiting an approximately constant growth rate. Regressions 
(5)-(6) are specified ias in Table 5, with ISPEED replaced with PISPEED, obtained as the (in-sample) predicted 
values of ISPEED regressed on theb institutional variables described in Table 7. Estimates of (1)-(4) are 
obtained by the GMM System estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998). M1 and M2 are the p-values of the 
Arellano-Bond statistics for first and second order correlation of residuals; Sargan is the p-value obtained by 
estimates of the two-step version of the models: a p-value of 1 implies that the null hypothesis that the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid cannot be rejected. Regressions (5)-(6) are Logit regressions with standard 
errors clustered by country. Robust p-values are reported in brackets; * denotes p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** 











Dyanamic Panel Regressions Logit Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPG(t) GDPGV(t) DGDPG(t) DGDPGV(t) SR5 SR0
GDPG(t-1) 0.429***  GDPG(t-1) -0.181*** -0.215***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
GDPGV(t-1) 0.235*** PISPEED(t) 0.00194*** 0.000686***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]












Constant 2.606*** 1.918*** 1.191* -0.626 -4.454*** -1.837***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.08] [0.43] [0.00] [0.00]
M1(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
M2(p-value) 0.61 0.19 0.09 0.01
Sargan(p-value) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Pseudo R2 0.29 0.12
Observations/Countries 939/48 939/48 891/48 891/48 642/48 642/48 35 
 
Appendix A. Data 
 
Our sample includes 52 countries, divided in regions as follows:  Developed Europe includes 
the following sixteen countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
the United Kingdom. Emerging Europe includes the following fourteen countries: Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Russia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Developed America includes the United States 
and Canada. Emerging  America ( Latin America) includes the following six countries: 
Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru. Emerging Asia includes the following 
eight countries: China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan Republic of 
China, and Thailand. Developed Asia includes Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand.  
 
 




Equity Premiums  We use (ex-post) equity excess returns as proxy measures of equity 
premiums. Equity market data at monthly frequency is taken from 
DataStream. The risk-free rate is the yield on government securities at 
maturities ranging from one month to three months, depending on data 
availability. Data is available from 1985 through 2009. Starting points 
vary by country. See Table A2 for details.  
Source: The primary source of the risk-free rate is DataStream but in 
the cases in which data is missing data is taken from the International 




Data is available from Data is available from 1985 through 2009. 
Starting points vary by country. See Table A2 for details.  
Source: DataStream. 
 
GDP growth  Growth of real gross domestic product from 1985 through 2008. 
Starting points vary by country. See Table A2 for details.   
Source: World Bank. 
Financial 
Globalization 
Our measure of globalization, called FGLOB, is the growth rate of 
financial openness, defined as the ratio of the sum of external assets and 
liabilities to GDP. Data is available for all countries except Slovakia 




We consider the governance indicators constructed by Kaufmann, Krey 
and Mastruzzi (2009) as measures of the quality of institutions. These 
include six survey-based measures of institutional quality: Control of 
Corruption, the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain;  Voice and Accountability, citizens’ ability to participate in 
selecting their government; Political Stability, the stability of elected 
government bodies, Government Effectiveness, the quality of public 
services and that of policy formulation and implementation; Regulatory 
Quality, the ability of the government to implement regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development; and Rule of Law,  the 
quality of contract enforcement and protection of property rights. Data 
is available for all countries from 1996 through 2008.   
Source: World Bank  
Corporate 
Governance 
We use three indicators of the corporate governance quality index 
constructed by De Nicolò, Laeven and Ueda (2008), and updated to the 
year 2008. The first indicator, Accounting Standards, captures the 
degree of accounting disclosure of firms in a country. The second 
indicator, Earning Smoothing, is a measure of “earnings capacity” that 
tracks the extent to which managers may conceal the true performance 
of firms using accruals to smooth fluctuations of annual profits.  Data is 
available from 1995 through 2008. Starting points vary by country. See 
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Table A2. Data availability (monthly) 
 
 
Equity Price Index Price to Earnings Ratio
Countries Data available Source Data available Data available
Argentina 1989:12-2009:04 IFS 1991:08-2009:04 1991:07-2009:04
Australia 1985:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1985:01-2009:04
Austria 1989:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1985:01-2009:04
Belgium 1985:01-2009:04 IFS 1985:01-2009:04 1985:01-2009:04
Bulgaria 1997:05-2009:04 IFS 2000:10-2009:04 1996:02-2009:04
Brazil 1994:07-2009:04 DS 1994:07-2009:04 1999:06-2009:04
Canada 1985:01-2009:04 IFS 1985:01-2009:04 1986:02-2009:04
Chile 1985:01-2009:04 IFS 1985:01-2009:04 1989:07-2009:04
China 1993:05-2009:04 DS 1990:12-2009:04 1993:08-2009:04
Czech Republic 1992:04-2009:04 DS 1993:09-2009:04 1993:12-2009:04
Colombia 1986:01-2009:04 IFS 1985:01-2009:04 1993:03-2009:04
Croatia 1997:06-2006:03 DS 1997:01-2009:04 1998:05-2009:04
Denmark 1985:06-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1985:01-2009:04
Estonia 1996:01-2009:05 IFS 1995:07-2009:04 1998:02-2009:04
Finland 1987:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1988:04-2009:04
France 1985:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1985:01-2009:04
Germany 1985:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1985:01-2009:04
Greece 1999:01-2009:05 IFS 1985:01-2009:04 1990:01-2009:04
Hong Kong 1985:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1985:01-2009:04
Hungary 1990:10-2009:04 DS 1991:06-2009:04 1991:07-2009:04
India 1991:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1990:01-2009:04
Indonesia 1986:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1991:02-2009:04
Ireland 1985:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1985:01-2009:04
Italy 1985:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1986:02-2009:04
Japan 1985:01-2009:04 IFS 1985:01-2009:04 1985:01-2009:04
Korea 1991:03-2009:04 IFS 1985:01-2009:04 1988:01-2009:04
Latvia 1994:05-2009:04 DS 1996:04-2009:04 1998:02-2009:04
Lithuania 1998:01-2008:12 IFS 1996:01-2009:04 1996:02-2009:04
Malaysia 1985:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1986:02-2009:04
Mexico 1985:01-2009:04 IFS 1988:01-2009:04 1990:07-2009:04
Netherland 1985:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1985:01-2009:04
New Zealand 1985:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1988:02-2009:04
Norway 1985:01-2009:04 IFS 1985:01-2009:04 1985:01-2009:04
Pakistan 1992:02-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1992:08-2009:04
Peru 1991:06-2009:04 DS 1994:01-2009:04 1994:01-2009:04
Philippines 1987:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1987:10-2009:04
Poland 1993:06-2009:04 DS 1994:03-2009:04 1994:03-2009:04
Portugal 1992:11-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1990:02-2009:04
Romania 1995:08-2009:04 DS 1996:12-2009:04 1998:02-2009:04
Russia Federation 1994:09-2009:04 DS 1993:09-2009:04 1995:04-2009:04
Singapore 1986:04-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1985:01-2009:04
Slovakia 1994:06-2008:12 DS 1993:09-2009:04 1997:02-2009:04
Slovenia 2003:05-2009:04 DS 1993:01-2009-04 1996:02-2009:04
Spain 1988:09-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1987:03-2009:04
Sweden 1983:01-2005:05 IFS 1985:01-2009:04 1985:01-2009:04
Switzerland 1985:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1985:01-2009:04
Taiwan 1985:01-2009:04 IFS 1985:01-2009:04 1988:05-2009:04
Thailand 1991:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1987:02-2009:04
Turkey 1990:01-2009:04 DS 1986:01-2009:04 1990:04-2009:04
UK 1985:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1985:01-2009:04
Ukraine 1993:01-2008:12 DS 1998:01-2009:04 1998:02-2009:04
US 1985:01-2009:04 DS 1985:01-2009:04 1985:01-2009:04
Interest rates 38 
 
 
Table A3. Data Availability (yearly) 
 
GDP Growth Financial Development Equity Market Liquidity
Countries Data available Data available Data available
Argentina 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Australia 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Austria 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Belgium 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Bulgaria 1981-2008 1992-2008 1995-2008
Brazil 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Canada 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Chile 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
China 1985-2008 - 1991-2007
Czech Republic 1991-2008 - 1994-2008
Colombia 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Croatia 1991-2008 1994-2008 1994-2008
Denmark 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Estonia 1981-2008 1993-2008 1997-2007
Finland 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
France 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Germany 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Greece 1985-2008 1992-2008 -
Hong Kong 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2007
Hungary 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
India 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Indonesia 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Ireland 1985-2008 1992-2008 1995-2007
Italy 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Japan 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Korea 1985-2008 - 1992-2008
Latvia 1985-2008 1994-2008 1996-2008
Lithuania 1991-2008 1994-2008 1995-2007
Malaysia 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Mexico 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Netherland 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
New Zealand 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Norway 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Pakistan 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Peru 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Philippines 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Poland 1991-2008 1992-2008 1991-2008
Portugal 1985-2008 1992-2008 1994-2008
Romania 1985-2008 1997-2008 1994-2008
Russia Federation 1990-2008 1994-2008 1992-2008
Singapore 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Slovakia 1985-2008 1992-2008 1994-2007
Slovenia 1991-2008 1992-2008 1995-2008
Spain 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Sweden 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Switzerland 1985-2008 1992-2008 1991-2008
Taiwan 1985-2008 - 1992-2008
Thailand 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
Turkey 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008
UK 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2007
Ukraine 1988-2008 - 1998-2008
US 1985-2008 1992-2008 1992-2008 39 
 
 








Countries Data available Data available Data available
Argentina 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Australia 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Austria 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Belgium 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Bulgaria - - -
Brazil 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Canada 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Chile 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
China 1995-2008 1995-2008 1996-2008
Czech Republic 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Colombia 1996-2008 1996-2008 1995-2008
Croatia 1995-2008 - -
Denmark 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Estonia - - -
Finland 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
France 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Germany 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Greece 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Hong Kong - - -
Hungary 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
India - - -
Indonesia 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Ireland 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Italy 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Japan 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Korea 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Latvia 1995-2008 - -
Lithuania - - -
Malaysia 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Mexico 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Netherland 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
New Zealand 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Norway 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Pakistan 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Peru 1996-2008 1998-2008 1995-2008
Philippines 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Poland 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Portugal 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Romania - - -
Russia Federatio 1996-2008 2003-2008 1998-2008
Singapore 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Slovakia 1999-2006 1996-2006 1998-2006
Slovenia - - -
Spain 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Sweden 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Switzerland 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Taiwan - - -
Thailand 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Turkey 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
UK 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008
Ukraine - - -
US 1995-2008 1995-2008 1995-2008